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I.

INTRODUCTION

This report examines California’s repeat offender law, known as Three Strikes, by
exploring the law’s history, passage, legality, and effects. 1 The purpose of this report is to inform
the reader on an aspect of criminal justice that has generated significant debate and discussion.
Specifically, because Three Strikes was passed and amended by the initiative process, the report
will examine the role that initiatives have played throughout the law’s existence. In addition,
this report analyzes the various legal challenges and constitutional issues raised by the different
provisions of the law.
Section II provides a general overview of the history, passage, and structure of the
original Three Strikes law passed in 1994. Three Strikes was the culmination of a trend moving
towards increasing the punishments levied against repeat offenders. Section III analyzes the
legality and effects of Three Strikes. The law has generated significant legal controversy and has
been litigated all the way to the United States Supreme Court.
Section IV provides an analysis of the major effects of Three Strikes, specifically, the
effects on crime reduction and prison operation costs. Finally, Section V discusses Proposition
36, which amended Three Strikes in 2012. Proposition 36 made some slight but notable changes
to Three Strikes, such as ensuring that individuals cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment
based on the commission of a non-serious and non-violent felony. Section V also discusses
Proposition 47, which will appear on the November 4th, 2014 ballot. Proposition 47 is limited in
scope and its primary purpose is to redefine many non-serious and non-violent crimes as
misdemeanors, thereby avoiding the mandatory sentence that would come with a third strike
felony.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE PASSAGE OF THREE STRIKES

The historical background is critical to a clear understanding of why Three Strikes was
passed. Prior to 1994, California had gone through a number of sentencing reforms. Several key
issues, such as lengthy sentences and prison conditions, emerged early in California’s history. 2
Part A discusses California’s sentencing structure prior to 1994 and the emergence of prison
related issues. Part B provides a general overview of criminal justice initiatives that, starting in
1972, created a trend that Three Strikes followed. Finally, Part C discusses the drafting and
passage of Three Strikes in both the California state legislature and through the initiative process.
A. Sentencing and Prisons Prior to 1994
1. Sentencing: Early Years, Indeterminate, and Determinate
California has gone through several different sentencing variations. 3 Early in
California’s history the sentencing structure utilized total judicial discretion within statutory
1

The term “Three Strikes” will be used throughout the report to refer to Assembly Bill 971 (March, 1994)
and Proposition 184 (November, 1994), collectively.
2
Kara Dansky, Understanding California Sentencing, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 45, 51–52 (2008).
3
Id. at 45.
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minimum and maximum terms limits.4 Criticisms of this early structure focused on the fact that
prisoners “were suffering imprisonment under unjust or unreasonably long sentences.” 5
Furthermore, the legislature had not provided any real means of reducing a sentence once it was
imposed, and the only remedy was the gubernatorial pardon or clemency, which governors were
reluctant to use because of political ramifications. 6 The late 19th and early 20th centuries saw
the development of probation and parole to combat prison overcrowding and lengthy sentences. 7
Major sentencing reform came in 1917 with the passage of the Indeterminate Sentencing
Act. The law’s goal was “to take from the trial judge the discretion of fixing definitely the term
of imprisonment and to vest it in the prison authorities within prescribed limits.” 9 Essentially, the
law mandated that when a person was convicted of a crime, the judge either gave that person
probation or sent that person to jail without making a decision on how long that person would be
incarcerated. The length of incarceration was determined by the Board of Prison Directors, later
known as the Adult Authority. The Board was constrained by the statutory limits.10
8

Finally in 1976, Governor Jerry Brown and the legislature enacted the Determinate
Sentencing Law. 11 The Determinate Sentencing Law allows judges to use discretion in imposing
one of three different prisons terms provided by statute. 12 If the court finds an aggravating
circumstance, then the court may sentence the person to the upper, or longer, prison term. 13
California continues to utilize the determinate sentencing system, subject to compliance with
mandatory sentencing under Three Strikes. 14
2. Prison Overcrowding: A Problem From the 19th Century
California prison conditions, prison costs, and prison overcrowding have been major
problems since California became a state. 15 California’s oldest prison, San Quentin State Prison,

4

Id.
Id. at n.48 (citing Governor Frederick F. Low, Governor’s Message (Dec. 4, 1865)).
6
Id. at 55.
7
Id. at 56–57.
8
Paula A. Johnson, Senate Bill 42—The End of the Indeterminate Sentence, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
133, 135 (1977) available at
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2258&context=lawreview; Act of May 18,
1917, ch. 527, § 1, 1917 Cal. Stat. 665 (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1160).
9
Sentencing Under Indeterminate Sentencing, 22A Cal. Jur. 3d Criminal Law: Post-Trial Proceedings §
426, (Aug. 1, 2014).
10
Id.
11
Dansky, supra note 2, at 56–57. As clarification, the current Governor Jerry Brown was also governor
in the 1970s before he became the California Attorney General and then Governor again.
12
Sentencing Under Determinate Sentencing Law, 22A Cal. Jur. 3d Criminal Law: Post-Trial Proceedings
§ 386, (August 1, 2014).
13
Id.
14
See, e.g., People v. Boyce, 59 Cal. 4th 672 (2014) (providing a discussion of California’s current
sentencing procedure in a criminal case).
15
Dansky, supra note 2, at 53.
5
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was constructed in 1852. By 1858 there were 600 prisoners in a facility built with only 68 cells. 16
In fact, it appears that most sentencing-related concepts, such as probation and parole, were
implemented partially in response to prison overcrowding. 17 Prison overcrowding and prison
costs have been major concerns since California became a state, and while Three Strikes plays a
role in those two issues, they existed before Three Strikes came into being.
B. Overview of Criminal Justice Initiatives from 1972 to 1994
Three Strikes was not the first time that California utilized the initiative process to affect
sentencing as it relates to violent criminals and repeat offenders. In fact, Californians had used
the initiative process at least once to address the issue prior to passage of Three Strikes. 18
Although the initiative process has existed in California since 1911, the most active use of the
initiative process in the criminal justice context began in 1972, with the passage of Proposition
17.
In 1972, the California Supreme Court held that the death penalty in California violated
the state constitution. 19 In response, the people passed Proposition 17, which amended the
California Constitution to provide that statutes imposing the death penalty were not
unconstitutional. 20 This appears to be the first time that California utilized the initiative process
to directly address a criminal sentence. However, Proposition 17 appeared to lack force after the
United States Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia, 21 which struck down every current
state death penalty statute in the United States. Furman was not a categorical bar to the death
penalty. 22 Instead, it was an attempt by the United States Supreme Court to regulate death
penalty statutes to ensure that the death penalty was not imposed arbitrarily. 23 Nevertheless, after
1972, the initiative process began to play an ever-increasing role in prisons, sentencing, and
punishment.
The initiative process reasserted itself once again in 1978 with the passage of Proposition
7. In an attempt to create a constitutionally permissive death penalty law, California enacted a
statute in 1977 that provided the death penalty in a murder case if a jury found that one of twelve
special circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt. 25 Dissatisfied with what he considered
24

16

Id. Interestingly, according to the San Quentin State Prison website, during construction of the facility,
prisoners slept on a ship called the Waban at night and labored on the prison during the day. San Quentin
State Prison, CAL. DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION,
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Facilities_Locator/SQ.html (last visited Sep. 12, 2014).
17
Dansky, supra note 2, at 60.
18
See Cal. Proposition 8 (1982).
19
People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628 (1972).
20
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION,
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1972, at 20, available at
http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1972g.pdf [“NOVEMBER 1972 VOTER GUIDE”].
21
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22
Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (1997).
23
Id.
24
Id. at 1310
25
Id. at 1308.
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a weak law, California State Senator John Briggs championed Proposition 7, which dramatically
expanded the scope of California’s new death penalty statute by “increasing the penalties for first
and second degree murder” and “expanding the list of special circumstances requiring a sentence
of death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.” 26 What is striking about
Proposition 7 is that it was a comprehensive law, which demonstrates the expanding role that
initiatives began to have in sentencing and criminal justice. 27
In 1982, Proposition 8 was passed, also known as The Victim’s Bill of Rights. 28 The
initiative was not passed without significant controversy in terms of its scope and legality. 29
Proposition 8 addressed a wide range of issues such as restrictions on bail, habitual criminals,
use of prior convictions in criminal proceedings, and restrictions on sentencing those over the
age of 18 to the Youth Authority. 30 In fact, Proposition 8 added a number of sections to the Penal
Code, including sections 667 and 1192.7, which would be amended and modified in 1994 by
passage of Three Strikes. 31 The habitual criminals section included enhancements for “any
person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony in
this state.” 32 Proposition 8 also flexed the muscles of the initiative process by placing restrictions
on how the law could later be amended. 33 While attaining a simple majority of both legislative
houses allowed the legislature to lengthen enhanced sentences, amending the law required the
two-thirds vote of both houses or an initiative approved by the electors. 34
There were predictions that the new bail restrictions, as well as the enhanced sentences,
would have a direct impact on prison overcrowding and financial resources. 35 In fact, the
California Attorney General at the time, who argued in favor of Proposition 8, highlighted that
more convictions would result in more prisoners: “There is absolutely no question that the
passage of this proposition will result in more criminal convictions [and] more criminals being
sentenced to state prison.” 36 Opponents argued that Proposition 8 would require millions of
dollars in new court procedures without money to pay for them. 37
In short, it appears that Three Strikes was not the first time that the initiative process
tackled the repeat offender issue. Propositions 7, 8, and 17 were not the only criminal justice
26

Id. at 1311.
See NOVEMBER 1972 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 20, at 20; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER
INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 7, 1978, at 32, available at
http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1978g.pdf [“NOVEMBER 1978 VOTER GUIDE”].
28
George Nicholson, Victims’ Rights, Remedies, and Resources: A Maturing Presence in American
Jurisprudence, 23 PAC. L. J. 815, 821 (1992).
29
Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236 (1982).
30
CAL SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, JUNE
8, 1982, at 33, 56 available at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1982p.pdf [“JUNE 1982
VOTER GUIDE”].
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 32.
36
Id. at 34.
37
Id. at 35.
27
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propositions passed during the 1970s and 1980s, but they were the most significant in scope and
purpose. Those propositions are significant because they represent a relatively sudden and
controversial entrance of the initiative process into criminal procedure. They also demonstrate
that Three Strikes was not the first time the state grappled with sentencing reform, prison
overcrowding, and fiscal responsibility. Proposition 8 was a sweeping reform, and by adding
numerous sections to the California Penal Code, it laid the foundation for the passage of Three
Strikes in the next decade.
C. Three Strikes: Creation and Passage
Three Strikes can be viewed as a high water mark in the campaign to punish repeat
offenders and sentence them to state prison. While the actual drafting of the 1994 Three Strikes
laws appears to have its genesis in the tragic murder of a young woman and a twelve year old
girl, the 1982 Victim’s Bill of Rights had already taken a substantial step towards punishing
repeat offenders. 38 However, it is helpful to view the passage of Three Strikes within the context
of the times in which it was created. Therefore, this section provides a brief summary of events
leading up to passage of the law.
The actual drafting of Three Strikes occurred because of the highly publicized murder of
a young woman named Kimber Reynolds in 1992, who was shot in the head during an attempted
robbery by a repeat offender. 39 Kimber’s father, Mike Reynolds, approached Justice James A.
Ardaiz, presiding justice for the Fifth District Court of Appeal, to enlist his help in drafting a law
to reduce serious and violent crime. 40 A legislative committee rejected this first attempt, but
Mike Reynolds shifted his focus and took the campaign to the people in the form of Proposition
184. 41
Around the same time that Mike Reynolds was building support for Proposition 184 in
1993, tragedy struck again when another repeat offender kidnapped and murdered a twelve year
old girl named Polly Klaas. 42 Polly’s death spurred overwhelming support for Mike Reynolds’
initiative, which made it onto the November ballot in 1994. 43
The initiative process was not the only vehicle for a major law targeting repeat offenders.
In fact, the text of Proposition 184 was virtually identical to the text of Assembly Bill 971,
developed by the California legislature in the wake of Polly Klaas’ murder. 44 Despite alternative
38

Id. at 33, 56.
Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395,
410 (1996).
40
James A. Ardaiz, California’s Three Strikes Law: History, Expectations, Consequences, 32 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 1, 1 (2000).
41
Vitiello, supra note 39, at 411.
42
Marc Klass, About the KlaasKids Foundation For Children, KLAAS KIDS FOUNDATION (Sep. 11,
2014), http://klaaskids.org/about/.
43
Vitiello, supra note 39, at 418.
44
David Esparza, The “Three Strikes and You’re Out” Law - A preliminary Assessment, LEGISLATIVE
ANALYST’S OFFICE (Sep. 11, 2014), available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/1995/010695_three_strikes/sc010695.html.
39
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bills and “an atmosphere of political distrust,” 45 Assembly Bill 971 passed and became law in
March of 1994. 46 In November of 1994, Proposition 184 passed, and both laws became known
collectively as “Three Strikes.”
The deaths of Kimber Reynolds and Polly Klaas were not the only reasons that Three
Strikes became law. Justice Ardaiz argued that Three Strikes was an attempt to prevent the
commission of crime and deter the repetition of crime through reform in sentencing. 47 Basically,
Three Strikes would serve as a powerful deterrent by sending the message that “further criminal
behavior will result in severe consequences; disregard this message at your peril.” 48 Furthermore,
Justice Ardaiz argued that the rate of recidivism 49 in California was well over 50 percent, the
second highest rate in the nation. 50 Indeed, proponents of Proposition 184 argued that Three
Strikes “keeps career criminals, who rape women, molest innocent children and commit murder,
behind bars where they belong.” 51
Ultimately, political realities probably contributed significantly to the passage of Three
Strikes both in the legislature and by the people. Governor Pete Wilson, up for reelection, was a
major supporter of Three Strikes and spoke at Polly Klaas’ funeral, advocating for the new law. 52
Additionally, the legal scholar Michael Vitiello argued that Mike Reynolds’ ability to sway the
public and use the press silenced those who may have opposed Three Strikes or attempted to
modify it. 53 Looking at California history, Three Strikes appears to be exactly the type of
situation that paralyzed sentencing reform in the early years of statehood: elected politicians are
reluctant to be viewed as soft on crime. 54
The 1994 debate surrounding Three Strikes was perhaps best described in the November
1994 Voter Guide. The analysis by the Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) states that passage of
Three Strikes would result in additional state operating costs, reaching an annual cost of $6
billion by 2026. 55 Furthermore, the state would incur a one-time $20 billion dollar expense to
build and expand prison facilities to accommodate the anticipated increase in prison
populations. 56 Proponents argued that Three Strikes would save lives and taxpayer dollars by
keeping violent prisoners in jail, and would relieve Californians of having to “pay the outrageous
45

Vitiello, supra note 39, at 418. Professor Vitiello explains that “[f]ew in the legislature were willing to
take on Reynolds or [Governor] Wilson who would have portrayed opponents as soft on crime, a tough
label to wear in 1994.” Id.
46
Id. at 418.
47
Ardaiz, supra note 40, at 3.
48
Id.
49
Recidivism occurs when criminals return to society after prior convictions and then commit more
crimes.
50
Ardaiz, supra note 40, at 5.
51
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION,
NOVEMBER 8, 1994, at 36 available at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1994g.pdf
[“NOVEMBER 1994 VOTER GUIDE”].
52
Vitiello, supra note 39, at 414.
53
Id. at 418.
54
Dansky, supra note 2, at 61.
55
NOVEMBER 1994 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 51, at 34.
56
Id. at 36.
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costs of running career criminals through the judicial system’s revolving door over and over
again.” 57 Opponents countered by stating that the prison system would be overwhelmed by nonviolent offenders and the state would incur billions of dollars in increased expenses. 58
1. Two Laws?
As previously discussed, Three Strikes passed in both the legislature and through the
initiative process. Why two laws? Functionally, there is not any textual difference between
Assembly Bill 971 and Proposition 184. 59 The major difference is that Assembly Bill 971
amended Penal Code Section 667.5, whereas Proposition 184 created Penal Code Section
1170.12. 60 Importantly, both laws provided the same method for amendment: a two-thirds vote
in both houses of the legislature or by a statute approved by the voters. 61 Then what would
happen if the legislature tried to amend section 667 of the Penal Code and not section 1170.12?
Which law has priority? The legal answer to that question is beyond the scope of this report, and
it does not appear that the issue has presented itself. Furthermore, given the fact that both
amendment clauses in each law are identical, the legislature or the people would presumably
amend both at the same time, which is exactly what happened with the passage of Proposition 36
in 2012. 62
2. How Does Three Strikes Work?
Three Strikes applies “strikes”—think baseball—to individuals who are convicted of
serious or violent felonies. 63 Some well-known examples of serious or violent felonies are
murder, robbery, and rape, but the total list is more expansive. If a person, who has one strike for
having been previously convicted of a serious or violent felony, is subsequently convicted of any
felony, whether or not it is serious or violent, that person receives double the required sentence
for the new conviction, and receives a second strike. 64 If the same person, who now has two
strikes, is convicted for any new felony, then that person receives a mandatory minimum term of
25 years, or three times the term otherwise required by law for the third conviction, whichever is
longer—think “out.” 65 Keep in mind that a person can receive more than one strike arising out of
a single criminal case. This occurs when a person is convicted of multiple felonies arising from
57

Id.
Id. at 37.
59
See id. at 64-65; see also Official California Legislative Information Assembly Bill 971 (Sept. 11,
2014), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/asm/ab_09511000/ab_971_bill_940307_chaptered.
60
Id.
61
See id. There may be a constitutional issue with a law passed by a simple majority binding future
legislatures with a supermajority provision. However, because Proposition 184 contains identical
amendment restrictions, the question is probably moot.
62
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION,
NOVEMBER 6, 2012, at 105, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/complete-vig-v2.pdf
[“NOVEMBER 2012 VOTER GUIDE”].
63
NOVEMBER 1994 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 51, at 33, 36.
64
Id.
65
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A). Prior to the passage of Proposition 36 in 2012, a third strike could
result in a life sentence.
58
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the same set of facts. 66 Furthermore, those people with at least one strike must be sent to state
prison and cannot be sentenced to probation or an alternative treatment program. Finally, a
person serving time in state prison under the Three Strikes must serve out the minimum sentence
without the possibility of early release. 67
As will be discussed later in this report, the initiative process has been used to amend
portions of the 1994 Three Strikes laws. However, the basic Three Strikes methodology persists
today.
III.

THE LEGALITY OF THREE STRIKES

Despite the broad support received for Three Strikes, there were several attacks to its
constitutionality. This section outlines the key court decisions that upheld the law and interpreted
the extent of judicial control over sentencing after Three Strikes. Part A discusses the U.S.
Supreme Court cases that decided Three Strikes sentencing does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. Part B outlines the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the judge’s ability
to reduce sentences even after a third strike felony conviction.
A. Constitutional Challenges: Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Some opponents of Three Strikes believed that the law constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 68 Based on the severity of the
mandatory sentencing, 69 even for non-violent third strikes, these opponents argued that the
punishment was “grossly disproportionate” to many of the crimes that constituted the “third
strike.” 70 In 2003, the opponents got their chance to challenge the constitutionality of Three
Strikes before the U.S. Supreme Court in Ewing v. California71 and Lockyer v. Andrade. 72
1. Ewing v. Andrade: Non-Serious and Non-Violent Third Strikes
In Ewing, the Supreme Court considered the case of Gary Ewing, who stole three golf
clubs from a golf course pro shop in 2000. 73 Priced at $399 each, the value of the golf clubs

66

See, e.g., People v. Benson, 18 Cal. 4th 24 (1998) (considering a case where the defendant was
convicted of two felonies arising out of the same occurrence when defendant gained entry to the victim’s
apartment and repeatedly stabbed her with a knife).
67
NOVEMBER 1994 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 51, at 56.
68
See Michel Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case: The Supreme Court Restores Democracy,
30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1643, 1647 (1997).
69
Section 667(e)(2)(A) of the California Penal Code states that upon receiving a third felony conviction,
defendants are required to serve at least twenty-five years and up to a life sentence.
70
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003).
71
See id. The original trial court chose not to reduce the grand theft charge to a misdemeanor and also did
not vacate Ewing’s four prior felony convictions. As such, “Ewing was sentenced under the three strikes
law to 25 years to life.” Id. at 21. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the decision, and the California
Supreme Court denied review of the decision. Id.
72
See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
73
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17–18.
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totaled less than $1,200 dollars. 74 Mr. Ewing was convicted of felony grand theft, which would
have resulted in a sentence of 10 years or less, 75 except that he had four prior serious felony
convictions. 76 Those prior felony convictions subjected him to the Three Strikes sentencing
requirement of 25 years to life for this new, non-violent and non-serious felony conviction. 77
The Court held that “recidivism” statutes like the Three Strikes law in California did not
sentence violators out of proportion to their “third strike” crime, and, therefore, are not
unconstitutional. 78 Rather, from the Court’s perspective, these laws are “nothing more than a
societal decision that when such a person commits yet another felony, he should be subjected to
the admittedly serious penalty of incarceration for life, subject only to the State’s judgment as to
whether to grant him parole.” 79 The Court further described how state legislatures needed
discretion in making sentencing decisions, instead of being impeded by the federal courts. 80
Indeed, although the Court noted the criticism of the Three Strikes law, 81 it ultimately stated,
“[t]his criticism is appropriately directed at the legislature, which has primary responsibility for
making the difficult policy choices that underlie any criminal sentencing scheme.” 82
Finally, it is notable that the Court found that the rationale for the Three Strikes law was
justifiable and that the outcomes of the law were impressive. 83 The Court stated that
“[r]ecidivism is a serious public safety concern in California and throughout the Nation” and that
after four years of the Three Strikes law in California, “the recidivism rate of parolees returned to
prison for the commission of a new crime dropped by nearly 25 percent.” 84 Additionally, the
Court seemed to consider evidence that parolees were leaving California because of the Three
Strikes law to be a sign of its efficacy. 85
74

Id. at 18.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer notes that before the Three Strikes law, “no one like Ewing
could have served more than 10 years in prison. We know that for certain because the maximum sentence
for Ewing’s crime of conviction, grand theft, was for most of that period 10 years . . . We also know that
the time that any offender actually served was likely far less than 10 years. This is because statistical data
show that the median time actually served for grand theft (other than auto theft) was about two years, and
90 percent of all those convicted of that crime served less than three or four years.” Ewing, 538 U.S. at 44
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
76
See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18. Ewing had four prior serious and/or violent felony convictions: three
burglaries and a robbery. Id. at 19.
77
Id. at 18, 20.
78
Id. at 21.
79
Id. (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 278, (1980)).
80
Id. at 25 (“Selecting the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state
legislatures, not federal courts.”).
81
Id. at 27–28 (citing FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET. AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES
AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001); Vitiello, supra note 39, at 423).
82
Id. at 28 (“We do not sit as a ‘superlegislature’ to second-guess these policy choices.”).
83
See id. at 26–27.
84
Id. (citations omitted).
85
Id. at 27 (referencing a report that found that “more than 1,000 net parolees left California” in the three
years following the enactment of Three Strikes) (citing California Dept. of Justice, Office of the Attorney
General, ‘‘Three Strikes and You’re Out’’—Its Impact on the California Criminal Justice System After
Four Years, p. 10 (1998)).
75
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In summary, the Court held that in determining whether a sentence was
“unconstitutionally disproportionate” to a crime, the court must look to both the “offense of
conviction, or the ‘triggering’ offense” along with the prior felony convictions. 86 As such,
Ewing’s sentence of 25 years to life was held to not be “grossly disproportionate to his
conviction for felony grand theft and his prior serious felony offenses.” 87 With its decision, the
Court not only upheld the constitutionality of three strikes laws similar to California’s, but it also
broadened the boundaries of what constituted proportional sentencing under the Eighth
Amendment. 88 Instead of considering only the crime of conviction in relation to the imposed
sentence, now courts could consider a defendant’s “entire criminal history on the proportionality
scales.” 89
2. Lockyer v. Andrade: Habeas Corpus Context
The same day that Ewing was decided, the Supreme Court issued a similar opinion in
Lockyer v. Andrade. 90 In Lockyer, the respondent Mr. Andrade had been convicted of two counts
of felony petty theft for stealing “approximately $150 worth of videotapes from two different
[Kmart] stores.” 91 Mr. Andrade had at least three prior felony convictions that were either
serious or violent, and, as such, these new felony convictions subjected him to the mandatory
sentence of 25 years to life. 92 In a somewhat unexpected application of the Three Strikes law, he
was sentenced to “two consecutive terms of 25 years to life” instead of merely one term “because
each of his petty theft convictions [] triggered a separate application of the three strikes law.” 93
Although Mr. Andrade was successful with his habeas corpus petition 94 in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit’s decision was
erroneous since Mr. Andrade’s sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment and that the
California appellate court’s decision was not “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, this
Court’s clearly established law.” 95 In its decision, the Court gave little indication of what
constitutes “clearly established Federal law” under the Eighth Amendment; it stated only that the
86

Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
88
Sara J. Lewis, Comment, The Cruel and Unusual Reality of California’s Three Strikes Law: Ewing v.
California and the Narrowing of the Eighth Amendment’s Proportionality Principle, 81 DENV. U. L. REV.
519, 532 (2003).
89
Id. at 532.
90
Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 63.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
A habeas corpus petition is brought by detained individuals who argue that their detention is unlawful.
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grossly disproportionate test is applied in determining whether sentencing is unconstitutional. 96
The Court warned that this determination of “grossly disproportionate” sentencing would only be
made in those cases that are “exceedingly rare and extreme.” 97
B. California Constitutional Challenge: Judicial Discretion
Judicial discretion in sentencing was a major issue that emerged after the passage of
Three Strikes. While formally judges had broad power to reduce sentencing, the Three Strikes
bill seemed to alter that power by allowing only prosecutors, and not judges, to “dismiss or
strike” a prior felony conviction if it was “in the furtherance of justice.” 98 However, section
667(f) of the Penal Code—the provision that appeared to strip judicial discretion in sentencing—
was worded in such a way as to make it unclear whether judges retained the ability to strike prior
felony convictions on their own motion. 99
As a result of the ambiguity in the statutory language, some judges continued to act on
their own to strike prior felony convictions. The Romero case, described below, confirmed that
trial court judges maintain some judicial control over sentencing in California in spite of the
Three Strikes law.
1. Judicial Discretion: People v. Superior Court (Romero)
In Romero, the California Supreme Court considered the authority of a San Diego trial
court judge to strike two prior felony convictions for a defendant who was charged with
possession of a controlled substance (0.13 grams of cocaine base). 100 The defendant had two
prior serious felonies (burglary and attempted burglary – both close to a decade old) that could
have increased his punishment to a life sentence, rather than the one to six years for the current
charge and prior drug convictions. 101 But the judge decided to strike the prior serious felonies,
reasoning that judges retained the authority to do so without the prosecutor’s motion since it
would otherwise be a violation of the state’s doctrine of separation of powers. 102
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court judge and held that judges do not
have the authority to strike prior felony allegations on their own motion based on the Three
Strikes law. 103 The California Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals,
finding that the legislature could curtail the judiciary’s role in sentencing but that it would violate
the state constitution to “subject to prosecutorial approval the court’s discretion to dispose of a
96
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criminal charge.” 104 The court’s decision addressed the interpretation of the Three Strikes bill,
but it also affected the interpretation of the Three Strikes initiative since it held that restricting a
judge’s authority in striking prior felony convictions would be unconstitutional. 105
2. Discretion in Sentencing After Three Strikes and Romero
After the affirmation of the Romero decision, there are two possible scenarios in which
discretion can be exercised over sentencing in the case of a third strike felony charge. 106 First,
the prosecution can decide to charge “wobbler” crimes—those crimes that could be considered
either misdemeanors or felonies—as misdemeanors, thereby avoiding the “third strike felony”
conviction. 107 Second, supported by the Romero decision, the prosecution or the judges
themselves have the power to strike prior serious or violent felony convictions from
consideration in the trial at issue. 108
The courts are still required to take into account the defendant’s “present felonies and
prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character,
and prospects” in determining if “the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in
whole or in part.” 109 Thus, judges continue to retain some authority to decide if a particular
defendant should be subject to the mandatory sentencing of Three Strikes. But that sentencing is
still obligatory if a prior strike is not vacated or if the prosecution does not reduce a “wobbler”
felony to a misdemeanor.
IV.

ERA OF STRICTER SENTENCING: OUTCOMES AND CRITICISM

The slogan of the Three Strikes campaign was to “keep[ ] career criminals, who rape
women, molest innocent children and commit murder, behind bars where they belong.” 110 It
further promised that it would “save[] lives and taxpayer dollars.” 111 The rationale for these last
two outcomes was based on the idea that fewer crimes would be committed because “career
criminals” would be locked-up and unable to commit crimes. 112 Additionally, proponents
reasoned that stricter sentencing would cause would-be criminals to reconsider involvement in
criminal activity. 113
What have been the consequences of Three Strikes over the past two decades?
This section provides some insight into that question. Yet, it is important to recognize that Three
Strikes is a piece (albeit a large piece) of a larger criminal justice puzzle within California. In
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addition to Three Strikes, there have been other significant changes to how criminals are
prosecuted and sentenced in California: other sentencing enhancements, shifts in the parole
system, and loosening of California evidence laws. 114 Therefore, it is difficult to determine an
exact causal link between Three Strikes and crime reduction and/or rising costs of California’s
prison population. 115
Part A of this section examines the relation between crime reduction and Three Strikes.
Next, Part B looks at the fiscal effects of an increased and aging prisoner population. Finally,
Part C outlines the criticism against Three Strikes based on the treatment of juveniles and
criminals with non-serious and non-violent three strikes.
A. Safer Streets as a Result of Stricter Sentences?
If the effectiveness of Three Strikes is judged based on the number of convicted criminals
that were sentenced under the law, then it has been an overwhelming success. 116 The dilemma
arises in attempting to evaluate the reduction in crime attributable to Three Strikes. In 2004,
Mike Reynolds, the primary proponent of Three Strikes, co-wrote a report that applauded the
results of Three Strikes and cited a decrease in violent and property crimes as an indication of the
law’s positive results. 117 Without a doubt, crime rates went down at a steady pace after Three
Strikes went into effect; until 2011, when violent crime increased “slightly,” and in 2012, when
property crime increased “noticeably.” 118 However, legal scholars highlight the fact that crime
rates began to drop before Three Strikes was passed, and they reason that the crime reduction
after Three Strikes is merely a coincidence. 119
At least one legal scholar contends that Three Strikes not only deters individuals from
committing crimes that would constitute a third strike, but it also deters people from committing
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crimes that count as a first or second strike (i.e., violent or serious felonies). 120 Critics, on the
other hand, argue that people do not engage in a rational, cost-benefit analysis before committing
crimes, but that they instead “make choices based on their own reference levels.” 121 The premise
behind this argument is that people who commit criminal acts often have “less than perfect
information” about the repercussions for those crimes, have a limited view of their own future,
and make decisions based on “their present desires and needs.” 122
B. Fiscal Effects: Cost of Incarceration
A 2004 RAND Corporation study predicted that the Three Strikes law would reduce
crime, but that the law would nevertheless increase the prison population and bring with it the
increased cost of $5.5 billion per year. 123 A similar study found that more funds would be needed
to handle the additional “capacity, health care costs for geriatric prisoners, and prison
construction.” 124 This sub-section describes the actual costs to California of Three Strikes,
including the costs associated with more prisoners and higher healthcare costs.
1. Prisoner Population
In 2009, the California State Auditor estimated that prisoners sentenced under Three
Strikes will have increased costs to California by approximately $19.2 billion by the end of their
sentences, and that 25 percent of the prison population was made-up of individuals sentenced by
the Three Strikes law (43,500 out of the total 171,500 prisoners). 125 Notably, $7.5 billion of
those increased costs will have been spent on prisoners who were convicted with a strike that
was neither violent nor serious. 126
The issue with long mandatory sentencing is that even if fewer people end up committing
crimes, there are still more people within the prison system over time. 127 As legal scholars have
explained, the impact of sentencing one person to a minimum of 25 years is similar to sentencing
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five offenders to a 5-year sentence, which creates large-scale impacts overtime. 128 However, an
alternative argument is that the “three striker” recidivists would be in and out of the prison
system regardless of whether the Three Strikes law was in effect. 129 The logic of this argument is
that any additional costs or increases in the prisoner population are not necessarily tied to Three
Strikes, since many of these individuals would still have contributed to prison costs without
Three Strikes. 130 Yet, the California State Auditor estimates that the individuals convicted under
Three Strikes receive an average of nine years more to their sentence than they would otherwise,
indicating that the overall time spent in prison by these individuals is longer under Three
Strikes. 131
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a decision by a Three-Judge Court that
California prisons were so overcrowded that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment. 132 The decision mandated that California reduce its inmate population to
137.5 percent of design capacity by June 27, 2013. 133 The California legislature has since passed
several laws as part of a comprehensive “realignment” effort to meet the judicial mandate. 134
Yet, the state has not been able to sufficiently reduce its prisoner population, and, as a result, the
deadline has been extended several times with the most recent extension giving the state until the
beginning of 2016. 135 California officials will need to continue to make reforms to the state
prison system in order to comply with the mandate, but any changes to Three Strikes would be
extremely difficult. The Three Strikes initiative and legislation both imposed amendment
restrictions on the law, and, therefore, it is impossible to touch Three Strikes without a voterapproved initiative or by a statute passed by two-thirds of both houses of the legislature. 136
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2. Aging Prisoner Population
Not surprisingly, older prisoners require more medical care, which increases the cost per
year spent on these “aging” prisoners. 137 The annual medical care of older prisoners ranges from
approximately $14,000 to $44,000 more than their younger incarcerated counterparts. 138 The
largest age group of individuals serving sentences under Three Strikes is in the age-range of 45
to 49 years old, 139 compared to the remaining prison population whose largest age group is in the
range between 25 to 29 years old. 140 Indeed, 53 percent of the prisoner population convicted
under Three Strikes is over the age of 40 years old. 141 Still, as of 2011, less than 4 percent of
prisoners in the Three Strikes category are over the age of 60 years old (the time at which
medical care costs, on average, are greatest). 142 But, some data predicts that by 2025 California
will have to spend more than $4 billion on prisoners who are over 60 years old. 143
Critics of Three Strikes also argue that aging prisoners should not be subject to the
mandatory sentencing because they pose “a low risk of violence” to the community. 144 However,
the California Supreme Court has held that Three Strikes prisoners are prohibited from being
released early, even with “good-time credits,” meaning they must serve their entire sentence
despite their potential old age or frailty. 145
C. Punishment for Low-Level Crime and Juvenile Convictions
Three Strikes has been criticized for its impact on individuals whose third strike is a non-
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violent and non-serious crime, 146 and for those individuals whose prior strikes were committed
when they were juveniles. 147 Under Three Strikes, certain serious or violent felonies committed
as juveniles are considered first or second strikes. 148 Additionally, although felonies that are nonserious or non-violent do not count as first strikes, they do constitute a second or third strike and
subject a third strike offender to mandatory sentencing. 149
A 2009 report found that 53 percent of all prisoners serving time under Three Strikes had
been convicted for non-serious and non-violent felonies. 150 As described above, third strike
crimes include crimes like grand theft where the total value of stolen items is $1,200 or less. 151
The original proponents of Three Strikes claimed that the law would put murderers and rapists
behind bars. 152 But the fact that the majority of prisoners sentenced under the law have been
convicted for non-violent crimes raises skepticism of the actual scope and efficacy of the law in
deterring and incarcerating violent criminals.
Another five percent of all the “striker” prisoners were subject to Three Strikes because
they had one or more juvenile offenses that counted as a felony strike. 153 Part of the concern in
counting juvenile crimes as strikes is due to the fact that minors in California do not always have
the benefit of jury trials and bail, and, therefore, they are not protected by the same procedural
safeguards available to adults. 154 Additionally, the juvenile system tends to focus more on
rehabilitation rather than punishment, which critics have found to be contradictory to the rigid
punitive nature of Three Strikes. 155 In response to these concerns, Three Strikes proponents
would likely point to the fact that juvenile crimes only count against an offender if they were
committed when the juvenile was 16 years or older, and that at such an age the juveniles should
be more responsible for their crimes. 156
V.

INITIATIVE RESPONSE TO THREE STRIKES

After Three Strikes passed in 1994, the initiative process attempted to address a wide
range of criminal justice issues. Between 1994 and 2004, the initiative process addressed issues
relating to sentencing, the definition of murder, and non-violent drug possession offenses.
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A. Limited Reform and a Failed Attempt at Reform
Proposition 36, passed in the year 2000 (not to be confused with a different and distinct
Proposition 36 passed in 2012), actively discussed reducing the prison population by removing
non-violent drug possession offenders and placing them in treatment programs. 157 However, the
text of Proposition 36 clearly indicated that the law did not apply to people sentenced under
Three Strikes, except in a limited number of circumstances. 158 Furthermore, the law restricted its
treatment provisions to those who had remained out of custody for a number of years and were
basically convicted only of simple non-violent drug possession. 159 One of the justifications of
taking non-violent drug offenders out of prison was to make room for serious or violent
criminals. 160
Proposition 66, which was on the ballot in 2004, would have made major changes to
Three Strikes by requiring a second and third strike felony to be serious or violent in order to
make Three Strikes applicable to the person convicted. 161 However, Proposition 66 failed to
pass, and a similar initiative was not presented until 2012.
B. Amending Three Strikes and Reducing Prison Populations
Three Strikes underwent modest reform in 2012. Proposition 36, the Three Strikes
Reform Act of 2012, amended numerous sections of the Penal Code, including sections 667 and
1170.12. 162 Under Proposition 36, the indeterminate life sentence for a non-violent and nonserious third strike is now only imposed on those who committed certain crimes with firearms
and/or those with a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense, child molestation, homicide, solicitation to commit homicide, specific murder of a
police officer, or possession of a weapon of mass destruction. 163 Further changes give judges
discretion to release prisoners serving a life sentence for non-violent and non-serious third
strikes, as long as the judge determines they are not a threat to society. 164
Thus, Proposition 36, while making significant changes to the imposition of a life
sentence, does not alter the basic structure of Three Strikes, and 25-year sentences are still
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imposed for a wide range of non-violent and non-serious felony third strikes. The findings and
declarations of Proposition 36 state that murderers, rapists, and child molesters will still serve
their full sentences, but certain offenders with a third strike for crimes like shoplifting or simple
drug possession will not receive mandatory life sentences. 165
The arguments put forth by proponents and opponents of Proposition 36 echoed the
issues raised in 1994. The LAO portion of the voter guide claimed that Proposition 36 would
save the state money by reducing prison populations and reducing parole expenses, totaling up to
$90 million annually. 166 Proponents argued several main points: make the punishment fit the
crime; save California millions of dollars each year; and make room in prison for dangerous
felons. 167 Opponents stated that dangerous felons would be summarily released from prison and
that law enforcement overwhelmingly rejects Three Strikes reform. 168
It may take a number of years for the positive or negative effects of Proposition 36 to
fully develop. One concrete change that has taken place is demonstrated by the Stanford Three
Strikes Project, which claims that over 1,000 persons have been resentenced and released under
Proposition 36 since its implementation. 169
C. Proposition 47: Reduced Penalties for Some Crimes Initiative
Proposition 47, on the 2014 ballot, is not an attempt to comprehensively reform Three
Strikes, but rather to prevent low-level criminals from being subject to a mandatory 25-year
sentence. In keeping with Three Strikes and Proposition 36, those individuals who have been
convicted for murder, rape, some sex offenses, or some gun crimes will not be eligible for a
reduced sentence under Proposition 47. 170
Proposition 47’s main aim is to redefine many non-serious and non-violent crimes as
misdemeanors, thereby avoiding the mandatory sentence that would come with a third strike
felony. 171 Indeed, in a 2009 report, it was found that 53 percent of all prisoners serving time
under Three Strikes had been convicted for non-serious and non-violent felonies. 172 For critics,
these statistics confirm that Three Strikes disproportionately punishes low-level criminals, rather
than targeting the reduction of violent crime. For supporters, these numbers only show that the
law is working by imprisoning repeat offenders that cannot control their criminal urges.
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If Proposition 47 passes, low-level crimes—such as the theft of $150 in videotapes at
issue in Lockyer 173—would be considered misdemeanors and no longer carry the 25-year
mandatory penalty required if they were third strike felonies. 174 However, the initiative places a
$950 cap on the amount of money that can be involved if the crime is to be classified as a
misdemeanor instead of a felony. 175 Therefore, the theft of $1,200 in golf clubs at issue in
Ewing 176 would still constitute a felony under the law proposed by Proposition 47. According to
the LAO, there would be “several thousand” current inmates whose sentences would be reduced
by Proposition 47, but they do not provide an estimate of the exact number of inmates who
would be effected by the new law. 177
Although Proposition 47 is not proposing comprehensive reform, it is notable that
Proposition 47 appears to be part of a growing trend to reshape and reduce the current prison
population. Proposition 47 is discussed in detail under that section of this volume of the
California Initiative Review. 178
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the last two decades, Three Strikes has made a significant impact on California’s
criminal justice system. 179 The enhanced sentencing structure is the culmination of a series of
laws aimed at punishing repeat offenders. 180 In 1994, the passage of Three Strikes was secured
by the political realities and public support for harsher punishments after the tragic murders of a
young woman and a twelve-year old girl. 181 While Three Strikes’ supporters claim credit for the
general trend of crime reduction in California, 182 critics remain skeptical that Three Strikes has
actually deterred criminals or reduced crime. 183 Additionally, the fiscal impact of Three Strikes
has been substantial, with an estimated $19.2 billion additional funds needed to operate
California prisons. 184
Despite attempts to reform or overturn the law through legal challenges and the initiative
process, Three Strikes weathered the storm for eighteen years until 2012 with the approval of
Proposition 36. 185 However, Proposition 36 did not provide wholesale reform or invalidation of
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Three Strikes, and the law is still very much alive and well in the California criminal justice
system today. 186
Now, Proposition 47 seeks to address the issue of long-term, mandatory sentencing under
Three Strikes for non-serious and non-violent third strike felonies. If Proposition 47 passes,
many low-level crimes would be considered misdemeanors and no longer carry the 25-year
mandatory penalty required if they were third strike felonies. 187 However, there is a $950
maximum crime amount that delineates a “felony” from a “misdemeanor.”
For the time being, the future of Three Strikes appears secure. Three Strikes supporters
dislike the recent changes under Proposition 36 and reject the premise that any further
modifications are needed through Proposition 47. But the fundamental nature of Three Strikes—
lengthy, mandatory sentences for repeat offenders—remains intact.
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